Big Promises, Thin Plans

Nepal’s parties have dressed up their election platforms in new labels. Some call them commitment papers, others a citizen contract, others a promise document. The branding is different, but the pitch is familiar. Rapid economic growth. Clean governance. Big leaps in roads and energy. Better schools and hospitals.

The scale of the promises is striking. Parties talk about pushing the economy to around Rs 10 trillion or more, lifting per capita income to $2,500 to $3,000, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs each year, with some pledges reaching around half a million annually, and raising installed capacity sharply, from today’s 3,878 MW to at least 14,000 MW in five years in one plan, and as high as 30,000 MW within a decade in another.

However, they are selling outcomes that would require a step change in how the state works, how capital is mobilised, and how projects get delivered. That is the central tension in this election cycle. Nepal’s nominal GDP is roughly $45.5 billion. Per capita GDP is around $1,535. About one in five people is unemployed. Installed power generation sits at 3,878 MW. Against that baseline, many targets look less like plans and more like wish lists, especially because parties rarely show the hard parts: where the money comes from, how risks are managed, who does what, and what will be cut or reformed to make room for new spending.

Still, the manifestos are not identical. The Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), and the Rastriya Swatantra Party all promise fast growth and a shift toward production, but they differ on the role of the private sector, how much the state should steer the economy, and what should come first: new spending, new laws, or new state capacity. The Nepali Congress frames the next five years as an “economic recovery half decade.” It pledges to expand the economy to Rs 11.5 trillion and raise per capita income to $2,500 through what it calls second generation reforms. Its headline is private sector led growth. It says it will mobilise Rs 13.75 trillion in investment, with 80% coming from the private sector, while the state focuses on facilitation, regulation, and social protection. Congress leans heavily on predictability. It proposes a minimum common economic agenda across major parties so that rules do not shift with every change of government. It also promises legal guarantees to keep tax rates and investment conditions stable for as long as fifteen years. On paper, it pairs this with reforms that businesses have long demanded: simpler licensing and registration through digital systems, faster commercial dispute resolution, clearer insolvency and exit rules, and stronger Special Economic Zones in every province.

Its tax proposals are among the most sweeping: personal income tax exemption up to Rs 1 million, a gradual corporate tax reduction toward 20%, a plan to lower VAT over time, and preferential treatment for export and production oriented industries. Congress also sets big trade and climate goals, including improving the export import ratio and moving toward net zero emissions by 2045. But its reform heavy approach still leaves a missing bridge. It does not clearly explain how the state will protect revenue, enforce compliance, and expand the tax base while simultaneously offering broad relief. CPN (UML) sets the most expansive growth claims. It promises an economy of Rs 10 trillion within five years and Rs 20 trillion within ten years, while sustaining annual growth in the 7 to 9% range. Its organising idea is production, employment, and self-reliance. It lists agriculture, energy, industry, tourism, infrastructure, information technology, irrigation, housing, and environmental management as priority sectors, with a strong emphasis on moving jobs back home.

UML promises to create around 500,000 jobs a year and reduce dependence on foreign employment. The route is a large push on infrastructure and production systems: modernising agriculture, expanding irrigation, promoting commercial farming, and shifting surplus labour into industry and services. It also talks about policy stability for investors and a more directed financial system that channels credit toward productive sectors, alongside a deeper capital market to draw in domestic and foreign investment.

The party’s manifesto mixes growth with welfare. It promises a higher minimum wage, wider social security coverage, concessional loans for education and entrepreneurship, and targeted support for youth, women, and migrant workers. It also leans into technology, including artificial intelligence and innovation hubs. But UML’s credibility question is execution. The state is central to its story, yet the country’s bottlenecks are largely state made: slow procurement, weak project management, delays in land and forest clearance, and legal disputes that drag for years.

The Rastriya Swatantra Party puts governance reform at the core of its economic agenda. It argues that Nepal cannot transform without improving state capacity, data systems, and regulatory quality. It targets average growth of 7%, an economy close to $100 billion within five to seven years, and per capita income above $3,000. Unlike the larger parties, it stresses productivity more than spending, and claims long term gains will come from efficient capital use, technology based industrialisation, and a business climate free of rent seeking and policy capture. RSP promises to repeal or amend dozens of outdated laws it says raise costs and discourage investment. It pledges a true one stop service system so investors can complete approvals without bouncing between agencies. It also proposes a more digital state: integrated databases linked to national ID, data driven policymaking, a stronger statistics system, and a National Planning Commission repositioned as a policy think tank. On taxes, it promises a lower overall burden while tackling evasion, avoiding retroactive rules, and allowing deductions for education, health, and childcare. It also pushes capital market reform, including new instruments, stronger regulation, and broader participation by institutional investors and non-resident Nepalis.

RSP’s governance first framing comes with its own vulnerabilities. The party is also trying to answer a live public controversy around cooperative and microfinance fraud. It has pledged relief to small depositors, including a Unified Savings Protection Fund and a promise to return money to depositors of crisis hit institutions within 100 days of forming a government. It argues the goal is not only punishment, but restitution, and suggests legal pathways for settlement when operators can credibly repay within a fixed deadline.

That pledge speaks to a wider political reality. Parties increasingly face voter anger not just about poverty or unemployment, but about the day to day failures of the state: delayed services, weak regulation, and impunity in financial scams. On that front, all major parties now promise corruption free governance and faster action against illicit wealth. Yet governance specialists and economists warn that institutional corruption is not something a government can end quickly through slogans. It demands reforms in laws, enforcement agencies, public procurement, the courts, and the civil service, plus the political discipline to stick with them.

The credibility gap is clearest on jobs, growth, and energy. Parties pledge to double the economy within one five-year parliamentary term and create around one million jobs. Yet roughly 500,000 people enter the labour market every year, and about 300,000 leave for foreign employment annually with new labour permits. Promises to create three to five hundred thousand jobs a year sound attractive in a country dependent on migrant work, but labour experts point out that jobs usually rise as a result of sustained investment and productivity growth, not as a standalone announcement.

On energy, the numbers are even more dramatic. Congress pledges to raise installed capacity to at least 14,000 MW within five years, effectively adding about 10,000 MW on top of today’s 3,878 MW, and to increase per capita consumption from about 450 units to 750. UML lists major flagship projects and promises timely completion of private projects. RSP sets a longer horizon, aiming for 30,000 MW within a decade and pushing for energy diplomacy and trade deals to expand exports. But former energy ministry officials and economists warn that exports alone cannot carry Nepal’s hydropower ambitions. The country still struggles to absorb monsoon season generation, and prices in export markets may not reliably cover costs. The real test is whether parties can expand industrial demand at home, build transmission and storage, manage currency risk, and create stable rules for power purchase, cross border trade, and land acquisition. Without that, big capacity targets become numbers on paper. This election cycle, then, is less about whether parties can dream big, and more about whether they can show a path from promise to delivery. Congress offers a private sector led story anchored in stability and fiscal reform, but it must reconcile tax relief with revenue reality. UML offers a production and infrastructure surge, but it must confront the state’s chronic execution failures. RSP offers governance and productivity, but it must prove it can translate reform language into institutions that work, while navigating its own political controversies.

The next government will face the same constraint regardless of who wins: Nepal’s economic ambitions will only become plausible when politics stops treating manifestos as marketing, and starts treating them as binding work plans, complete with financing, timelines, and measurable results.

(This report was originally published in March 2026 issue of New Business Age magazine.)